The goal of this article is to test whether the threat of regulating (or of more stringent regulation of) automobile liability insurance as portrayed in the popular and industry press induces insurers to change the way they price their policies. More to the point, using quarterly state data from 1984 to 1993, the author attempts to determine whether insurance companies reduced premium increases to avoid regulation, a test the article will call the Regulatory Threat Hypothesis. The results suggest that automobile liability insurance premiums increased at a slower pace (or decrease) in the presence of a regulatory threat.
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
It is well known that firms react to outside pressure. Many companies have public relations departments to deal with pressure groups and other outside forces that may affect profits. Insurance companies faced such outside pressure in the mid-to late-1980s during the so-called insurance liability crisis. This crisis affected all types of liability insurance, including personal automobile liability insurance. 1 The 1980s Martin Boyer is assistant professor, Department of Finance, École des Hautes Études Commerciales, Université de Montréal, and fellow, CIRANO, both in Montréal, Canada. The author would like to thank Sharon Tennyson for letting him use some of her data. He also thanks Diana Lee at the National Association of Independent Insurers; Robert Gagné, André Blais, Caroline Boivin, Daniel Parent, and seminar participants at the University of Minnesota; Université Laval; Insurance Federation of Minnesota; American Risk and Insurance Association; and Société Canadienne de Sciences Économiques for discussions and comments. The input of two anonymous referees was also appreciated. This work benefited from the financial and technical support of the S.S. Huebner Foundation at the University of Pennsylvania. 1 Berger, Cummins, and Tennyson (1994) examine the case of the general liability insurance crisis and its effect on the greater general liability reinsurance market. For a detailed exposition of the liability crisis in personal automobile insurance, see Cummins and Tennyson (1992) .
was also a period of great political pressure on state regulators. Consumer groups throughout the United States petitioned state regulators to mandate insurance firms to reduce premiums, or at least the rate of increase. One consumer group collected so many signatures that California held a referendum in November 1988 on automobile insurance premiums regulation. The referendum was known as Proposition 103.
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The referendum basically asked whether insurance companies should be mandated to reduce automobile liability premiums and whether any premium increase should be approved by an elected insurance commissioner. 3 The popular vote was almost evenly divided, but ultimately Proposition 103 passed with 51 percent of the vote. A main driver of the vote was the behavior of city dwellers (especially in Orange County) who saw an opportunity to extract money from suburban residents. Higher premiums are paid in cities, and city dwellers voted in favor of Proposition 103 since it asked for rates to be based on experience rather than geographic location. This behavior would follow the argument initiated by Peltzman (1976) , who argued that different groups use their political clout to influence regulation.
The vote rocked the stock market, as the value of insurance companies publicly traded plummeted. Fields et al. (1990) found that insurance companies doing business in California had an average cumulative abnormal return of -6.9 percent, which means that insurers' stock prices under-performed the market by 6.9 percent. In addition, the more business a company had in California, the greater the negative cumulative abnormal return. What is even more surprising is that a firm's proportion of business in states neighboring California also had a negative effect on the cumulative abnormal return. Moreover, the stock price of some firms with no operation in California also fell. 4 One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that investors in firms operating in states neighboring California were afraid that insurance rates were going to be controlled there as well. In fact, this concern may have been well founded; according to a survey, 90 percent of Americans would be in favor of passing a law similar to California's Proposition 103. 5 If investors perceived threats of regulation in states other than California, then one has to wonder whether the insurance companies themselves perceived such regulatory threats. If the insurance industry acknowledges the possibility of regulation, then it seems natural to conclude that it will do something to reduce the probability of such regulation. The question is, What should the industry do? The insurance industry can react to the threat of regulation in at least two ways.
The first is to influence the regulator so that it becomes more conciliatory toward insurers. 6 The second is to persuade the population through voluntary price reductions not to support state insurance commissioners' threat of more stringent regulation. The former tactic is in line with the capture theory idea introduced by Stigler (1971) and Posner (1974) , while the latter is the main subject of this article. Obviously, the industry can use both tactics at the same time. Think of a game in which insurance firms first set premiums (perhaps voluntarily reduce them in certain instances) and then compete with so-called consumer groups to capture the regulator. If premiums are set low, consumer groups would be less inclined to devote money and energy to capturing the regulator since they do not have much to gain. As a consequence, it becomes easier for the industry to capture the regulator since they are the only ones applying pressure. Once the regulator has been captured, insurers can then increase premiums to normal levels.
The use of voluntary price restraints by producers has been shown by Erfle and McMillan (1990;  see also Grofman, 1989, and Glazer and McMillan, 1992) . They showed that during the oil crisis of the Seventies, firms voluntarily reduced price increases of the most visible sort of oil to convince the federal government that no price ceilings were needed.
In this article, the author applies a technique similar to that of Erfle and McMillan (1990) to test the regulatory threat hypothesis for the property and liability insurance industry. According to that hypothesis, insurance companies in markets where price regulation (or more stringent price regulation) is possible should voluntarily reduce premiums or premium increases to signal to the population and the regulator that premiums are not too high and that further regulation is not necessary. This article uses the automobile liability insurance industry because it is already a heavily regulated sector in many states. Furthermore, a large movement toward insurance rate suppressions occurred during the insurance liability crisis of the mid-1980s (see Harrington, 1992, and Kramer, 1992) and before that (see Harrington, 1987) . Therefore, the threat of regulation or the threat of more stringent regulation may have been more credible than in any other given economic sector.
To test the model, the author used the Fast Track data tapes available through the National Association of Independent Insurers (NAII). These tapes provide basic, quarterly insurance market data for every state, plus the District of Columbia. Such data include total premiums paid, number of exposure units, and total losses incurred. The tapes span 1984 to 1993 inclusively. This period is significant because the liability crisis occurred in 1987-89. Therefore, the tapes offer a sufficient number of observation quarters before and after the crisis to test the article's regulatory threat hypothesis. This article's contributions are two-fold. The first is the empirical analysis of the pricing behavior of insurers threatened by regulation. 7 The second concerns the construction of the regulatory threat variable. The author researched close to 130 newspapers and business journals from 1984 to 1993 and highlighted all the threats of regulation that arose in every state for any quarter of any year. The regulatory threat variable took the value one if there was discussion of liability insurance premium regulation.
The main result the author obtained is that the threat of regulation had a significant effect on the pricing behavior of insurance companies in the personal automobile liability insurance industry. It was also found that price increases were significantly smaller after the passage of Proposition 103 in California. The author concludes from these two results that the insurance industry reduced premium inflation as a result of regulatory threats reported by the news media. The author also concludes that the passage of Proposition 103 sent a signal to the industry that regulation or more stringent regulation was a serious possibility after 1988.
The article is structured as follows. In the section titled "Model," the author develops a simple model of how firms price their product. The primary results are presented in the section of the same name. The ordinary least-square analysis is first presented to determine what affects the average premium increase 8 in a state in a quarter. It was found that price increases are smaller whenever a threat of regulation exists. The next section presents a two-step estimator procedure to control for the simultaneity between premium increase and the presence of a regulatory threat. After controlling for many outside factors, evidence is found to support the regulatory threat hypothesis that is quite robust to model variations ("Robustness" section). Finally, the article concludes.
MODEL

Institutional Background
Insurance services in the United States are regulated at the state level under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Each state appoints an insurance commissioner (or regulator), who oversees insurance practices in the state. The level of intervention of insurance commissioners varies greatly not only across states, but also across lines of insurance within a state. Insurance commissioners are either appointed by the state or elected by the general population.
Four broad types of statutory systems exist in the United States. The least stringent is called No File (NF). In this case, insurance companies are not required to file their 7 A similar study was done by Erfle and McMillan (1990) for the oil and gas industry. Erfle and McMillan collected four years' worth of weekly data for the state of New York for six oil and gas companies. This yielded a maximum of 1,218 observations. This article studied ten years of quarterly data for fifty states and the District of Columbia. This yields a potential of 2,040 observations. 8 This article shall refer to premium increases to indicate premium variations (premium increases and premium decreases). Premium decreases should therefore be viewed as negative increases.
rates with the state insurance department. Insurance companies, however, need to keep a historical database of their rates and experience and make it available to the insurance commissioner on request. The second type of statutory system is called File and Use (F&U) and Use and File (U&F). 9 In this type of statutory system, rates must be filed with the state insurance department either before (F&U) they are used or after (U&F) they have been used. Specific approval is not required, but the insurance commissioner reserves the right of subsequent disapproval. A third type of statutory system is called Prior Approval (PA). In this case, rates must be filed with the insurance commissioner, who must approve them.
10 Finally, the last type of statutory system involves the office of the insurance commissioner setting the rates. This type of regulation is called Promulgated (PR).
Control over prices is not exercised with the same degree of stringency even within one class of statutory system. Basically, in NF, U&F, and F&U states, regulators do not exercise control over prices, although some do. In PA systems, regulators exercise more control over prices, and some regulators more than others (Massachusetts and North Carolina being good examples of stringent regulatory behavior).
A broad trend toward automobile insurance regulation has occurred in the past 30 years. Joskow (1973) first noticed that insurance commissioners helped insurance companies maintain higher-than-competitive rates by helping collusion among insurers. The wave of deregulation in the late 1970s and early 1980s was associated with a marked reduction in premiums paid, since collusion among insurers was no longer helped by the insurance commissioners. In the late 1980s, the regulation pendulum was moving toward regulation that suppressed rates. Thus, insurance commissioners were no longer allies of the insurance industry, but rather allies of consumer groups that believed insurance companies were making excessive profits. The liability crisis of the late 1980s fell right in the midst of this wave of reregulation.
Insurance companies that previously welcomed the presence of tight regulation were now worried about becoming regulated again. 11 The new commissioners were presumably less likely to act in the best interests of insurance companies. Thus, insurers were some of the staunchest opponents of the reregulation frenzy of the late 1980s and early 1990s.
This article fits exactly within that time frame. Perhaps because the available reinsurance capital was drying up (see Berger, Cummins, and Tennyson, 1992) , or because enormous liability settlements were being awarded by the courts, insurance companies faced greater losses and had little reserves left in the 1980s. This was called the liability crisis. Insurers needed to increase premiums to offset those two capital-reducing events. Premium increases were not welcomed by the general population. Consumer groups pressed for reregulation that would establish price ceilings and other constraints on insurers. This article documents how insurers responded to regulatory threats during the liability crisis. It argues that a simple way to respond is to reduce premium increases to reassure consumers that more stringent regulation in the form of a price ceiling is not warranted.
Model
The model in this article draws extensively on that of Erfle and McMillan (1990) . Suppose the insurance industry is not indifferent between voluntary and mandatory restraints. Although both restraints lead to the same results in the short term, voluntary restraints are not necessarily permanent. Mandatory restraints, however, can be somewhat permanent in that the industry cannot remove them as it wishes. The value of the firm today depends on its expected value in the next period. The firm's nextperiod value is either V U if the regulatory environment remains unchanged or V R if the regulatory environment is more stringent.
12 Assume that
) 0 and ( ) 0 , where p is the premium charged by the firm and y is a vector of all other factors in the economy that may influence a firm's value. Let q be the probability that the value of the firm is V R . If q is independent of the firm's behavior, the expected value of the firm is
Suppose now that q depends on the price the firm charges for its service, namely liability insurance. In other words, suppose that q = q (p, x) , where p is the price of a liability insurance contract and x is a vector of some outside parameters over which a firm has no control. The first order condition of this program is dEV dp q x p dV U dp V U p V R dq dp x p
Suppose that dq dp ≥ 0 . 13 It follows that dV dp U ≥ 0. Denote by p* the equilibrium price charged by the industry if its behavior has no effect on the probability of being 12 As mentioned earlier, this article assumes that regulation is not good for the insurance industry in that more stringent regulation means lower price ceilings. This seems like a plausible assumption for the time frame under study. It is true that in the past, more stringent regulation often meant higher price floors (see Joskow, 1973) . This was no longer the case, however, in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Kramer, 1992, and Harrington, 1992) . 13 The question is not whether it makes sense for dq dp to be positive, but rather whether it makes sense to be anything else. Suppose dq dp is negative. Thus the higher the price for insurance, the less probable regulation becomes. This does not make much sense in today's business environment. It seems more likely that an industry is more apt to be regulated if it charges too high a price than too low. Therefore, it is logical to presume that dq dp is positive.
(1)
regulated. Since dV dp U is positive when dq dp > 0 , it must be that p < p*. Therefore, if there is a non-zero chance that the insurance industry will become regulated, then insurers will charge a lower premium than they will when under no threat of regulation.
The test conducted in this article is whether the threat of regulation influenced the pricing of liability insurance. The author wants to assess the effect a change in the value of q has on the price charged by insurers. Isolating dV dp U in the previous equation yields dV dp V p V dq dp
We see from this equation that if the probability of being regulated (q) increases, and dq dp remains constant, 14 then dV dp U must also increase. Thus the price that an insurer charges its policyholder must decrease. Alternatively, if dq dp increases, then dV dp U must also increase; this means that the equilibrium price must decrease. Therefore, as the probability of regulation increases, insurance companies should reduce premium increases. We also need to control for the effect of price on the probability of more stringent regulation, using a two-step procedure.
Let PREMAVG t be the average liability insurance premium paid in quarter t.
AUTOINC t is then the premium percentage change in quarter t compared to quarter t -1. Under perfect market conditions, some equilibrium premium exists such that the insurance market clears. The actual premium may diverge from the equilibrium premium because of external factors such as demand shocks, factor cost changes, and, more important to us, regulatory threats. Premium changes should therefore depend positively on the premium observed and negatively on the threat of regulation.
To test this simple model, we need to use a line of insurance that is subject to regulation and whose possible regulation was discussed extensively for a time. The line is personal automobile liability insurance, and the time is the liability crisis of the late 1980s. + ρ(p), then variations in φ (x) affect q(x,p) but not dq/dp . 15 Automobile liability insurance presents two interesting characteristics. First, it is readily available. And second, the regulation of it was a subject of considerable controversy in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Testable Model
Presented first is the dependent variable, the average premium increase in automobile liability insurance. The data on insurance prices come from the National Association of Independent Insurers (NAII) Fast Track Data Tapes. Insurance companies reporting to the NAII are typically the larger insurers. Although this factor may cause a bias in some instances, it is not believed to be large in this article. The reason is that larger companies are expected to be more responsive to political pressure, as Erfle and McMillan (1990) found for the oil industry. Another limitation of the NAII tapes is that reporting varies across companies (for example, the definition of a claim paid varies across companies) and the reporting is not subject to stringent edit screens as in other databases such as the NAIC's or Bests'. The Fast Track tapes provide information on both the automobile and homeowner insurance markets. The data are divided by state and by quarter. Ten years of data (1984 through 1993) were accessible. The states of California and New Jersey have been removed from the data set because of omissions in the data, 16 and so has the District of Columbia. Because of the presence of lagged variables, we are left with quarterly data for 48 states that span nine years (1985 through 1993) . This yields a total of 1,764 observations. The NAII tapes provide the total number of units insured in a state in a quarter (exposure units) and the total earned premium amount for the same period. This article shall use the ratio of total earned premiums to total exposure units as the measure of the price of insurance (PREMAVG). The dependent variable is constructed with this price of insurance. The percentage increase in the average premium in automobile liability insurance (AUTOINC) is calculated.
17 It is thus constructed as AUTOINC 100 PREMAVG -PREMAVG PREMAVG We see in Figure 1 that the three types of insurance followed the same pattern, especially after period 18 (which corresponds to the second quarter of 1989). COMPINC and AUTOINC have closer patterns than HOMEINC, which is to be expected since the first two relate to the same underlying product, the automobile. This makes it even more important to control for premium increases in other lines of insurance. 16 The passage of Proposition 103 in California and the Fair Access to Insurance Reform Act of 1992 in New Jersey prohibited statistical agents from publishing information on California and New Jersey. Even if the information on California were available, the author does not believe including it would make for sound econometrics. By including California, the regulatory threat hypothesis would be biased toward not rejecting it since there was a great deal of talk about rate regulation in California after the passage of Proposition 103, and premiums dropped suddenly in 1989. And since the article uses what happened in California as a starting point for all the regulatory movements, including California would amount to double-counting events that occurred there. 17 A lagged value shall be denoted with subscript t-1. For example, the lagged value of PREMAVG is given by PREMAVG t-1 . When there is no subscript, the article refers to the current period.
(4)
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Note also that premium increases seem to be more variable for homeowners insurance. This observation from the figure is confirmed when we look at the summary statistics in Table 1 . But correcting for endogeneity among the three lines of insurance does not change the main results of the article. If anything, the size of the THREAT coefficient becomes more negative and more significant.
FIGURE 1
A seasonal pattern in premium increases is also observed. This suggests that the data will need to be deseasonalized using dummy variables for quarters. Another interesting observation regarding premium increases is that a sharp drop occurs in the last quarter of the last year of the data (period 36), which might have been caused by redlining issues that came to light in 1993.
Figure 2 illustrates how the average premium and the average loss evolved from 1985 to 1993. We see that until 1991 (period 25), the average loss and the average premium were very close. In 1991, however, average losses seem to stabilize, while average premiums keep increasing. Thus premium increases seem to have been warranted before 1991, as most if not all of them were returned to policyholders as indemnity payments. This is no longer the case starting in 1991 as it can be observed that the gap between the average premium and the average loss increases and reaches a maximum in late 1993.
What needs to be constructed now is a variable that measures the perceived threat of automobile liability insurance regulation or of more stringent regulation by the insurance industry itself. The author shall use the level of public attention to automobile insurance rate reduction in the news media as an approximation of the threat of regulation. It seems appropriate to use the amount of publicity that rate regulation gets in the press, since previous studies, such as Iyengar et al. (1982) and Behr and Iyengar (1985) , have found that although the media cannot tell the public what to think, they can tell the public what to think about. Their results suggest that as the news media direct their attention to a certain subject, or intensify their coverage of it, the public starts to think more deeply about it. This can possibly generate political pressure until the issue put forward in the media is resolved.
FIGURE 2
The regulatory threat variable (THREAT) was constructed with the LEXIS/NEXIS online service. The author went through LEXIS/NEXIS to research all references to automobile insurance rate regulation in the United States between 1984 and 1993.
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About 130 newspaper and business journal titles were included in the search. The THREAT variable is constructed as a dummy whose value equals one when there is some reference to automobile insurance rate regulation in a state in that quarter, and zero otherwise. 19 The THREAT variable was constructed in this manner to represent all discussions, whether in newspapers not included in LEXIS/NEXIS, or on the radio and television, that could have occurred in the state on automobile insurance rate regulation. 
where index t represents the period and j represents the state. The author's regulatory threat hypothesis predicts that media coverage of the regulation issue will nega- 18 The exact search on LEXIS/NEXIS was performed with the following parameters: insurance with regulation in the same sentence, and rate with regulation in the same paragraph, and automobile, and date between 1983 and 1994. This search provided 2,134 hits. After eliminating the articles that were irrelevant (for example, the author eliminated the hits related to automobile credit insurance regulation), 154 usable hits were left. 19 Taking into account multiple hits does not change the results significantly, as discussed in the "Two-Step" section. 20 The threat data is available from the author on request. 21 The list, construction, and source of the variables are provided in the appendix. (5) tively affect the percentage premium increase of automobile liability insurance. Therefore, assuming that the regulatory threat variable represents the amount of political pressure on regulating automobile liability insurance more stringently, the author expects the THREAT coefficient to be negative. 
PRIMARY RESULTS
OLS Results
The author begins by showing what shall be used as the structural model in the twostep procedure. The variable of interest in this article is THREAT. It appears in Table  2 that the threat of regulation negatively affected the increase in the average premium for automobile liability insurance during the liability crisis of the late 1980s. Its effect is of the predicted sign, but significant at the 10 percent level only.
Also included as an explanation for automobile liability premium increases are premium increases for two other lines of insurance. This was done to control for insurance price increases in general, perhaps owing to greater expenses. The author expected the effect on AUTOINC of the price increase in comprehensive automobile insurance (COMPINC) and in homeowners insurance (HOMEINC) to be positive.
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Furthermore, since comprehensive insurance relates basically to the same insured good, it is natural to expect COMPINC to have a greater effect on AUTOINC than on HOMEINC. It seems that the author was right. The coefficient of COMPINC is indeed positive and greater than the coefficient of HOMEINC, which is also positive. Both coefficients are significantly different from zero. The author also controls for the average premium paid by policyholders and for insurance market conditions observed last period. As specified in the model, it is expected that the greater PREMAVG is, the greater the premium percentage increase will be. It seems that our expectations are not supported, since the coefficient of PREMAVG is negative and significant at the 1 percent level. This result could support the view, however, that the optimal premium is a concave function, and thus that, all else being equal, the greater the premium the smaller the increase. Past market conditions are included in the analysis because insurers use this information to decide what kind of price increase is warranted in this period.
The first such variable is last period's percentage price increase, AUTOINC t-1 . It is expected that last period's price increase should positively affect the current period's price increase. The reasoning is that if policyholders were willing to accept a given premium increase last quarter, they might still be willing to accept a similar price increase this quarter. The other lagged variable included is the unit price of insurance, UNIT t-1 . The unit price is given by the ratio of total premiums earned to total losses incurred. This variable is expected to have a negative effect on this quarter's premium increase. The author's hypothesis is based on the fact that a greater unit price last quarter means that the insurer collected relatively more premiums than it paid in losses. As a result, the insurer may feel pressure to decrease premiums this quarter because of the excess reserves accumulated last quarter. The author's results seem to support those expectations. The coefficient of AUTOINC t-1 is positive and the coefficient of UNIT t-1 is negative. Furthermore, both are significant at the 1 percent level. 22 The reason comprehensive insurance was used instead of collision was purely arbitrary. The results were almost the same whether comprehensive or collision was used to represent price increases in automobile insurance in general. In the Robustness section of this article, the use of insurance-industry-based cost factors is discussed. Using more basic factors such as price indices of automobile, gas, and health-care services does not change the results dramatically. A few indicators were also added to correct for seasonality (Q1, Q2, Q3), the passage of Proposition 103 in California (PROP103), and some apparent shocks in 1993 (DUM93). If the passage of Proposition 103 did indeed send a credible message 23 to the markets that regulation had a higher probability of occurrence, then its coefficient should be expected to be negative. According to the results, the effect of PROP103 on the price increase of automobile liability insurance is significant and of the expected sign. It is conjectured 24 that the effect of DUM93 may be because of redlining problems that surfaced in 1993. If this is the case, then a negative sign for DUM93 should be expected. (DUM93 is indeed significant and of the expected sign). This variable is constructed as a dummy variable whose value is 1 for the year 1993 and zero otherwise.
The significance of DUM93 and PROP103 prompted the author to check whether two types of trends were in the data set. A logical breaking point in the trend is the passage of Proposition 103 in California. It is quite possible that there was some trend before the passage of Proposition 103, and some other trend after. It seems that this is the case; there seems to have been no particular trend before the passage of Proposition 103 (TREND) and a negative and significant trend afterwards (TREND103). This means that premium increases were becoming smaller quarter after quarter after the passage of Proposition 103.
Finally, the author controlled for expected general financial market conditions. An insurer anticipates those financial conditions when deciding what premium to charge. These general financial variables are the expected return on the United States threemonth Treasury bill (TBILL), on long-term corporate debt (CORPBOND), and on the Standard & Poor's 500 stock index (SNP500). These returns are all in real terms. The article also includes the expected rate of inflation (CPI).
The reason those variables are included is that insurers base their premiums on the amount of investment income they expect to receive by investing the premiums they collect (see Myers and Cohn, 1987, and Cummins, 1992) . Thus, if an insurer expects higher investment income, it will be able to reduce premiums accordingly. Therefore, the expected return on United States Treasury bill, on long-term corporate debt, and on the S&P 500 should have a negative effect on AUTOINC. In other words, a higher expected investment return should translate into lower average premiums. Conversely, a higher expected rate of inflation should be met with higher premiums because losses will be relatively larger in the future.
Those expectations were calculated by regressing a quarter's return over the return obtained in the last three quarters, a trend variable and quarter dummies. Using the predicted values of those regressions gives the expected return of an insurer. The regressions are shown in Table 3 . Only the expected return on the United States three-month Treasury bill (TBILL) is significant at the 1 percent level and of the expected sign. The expected rate of inflation (CPI) is also of the predicted sign and significant at the 10 percent level. The expected return on the S&P500 (SNP500) is not of the correct sign, but it is not significant either. Finally, it is seen that expected return on long-term corporate debt (CORPBOND) is also not of the predicted sign and that it is significant. A possible explanation for this result is that the rate of return on corporate debt does not represent the possible investment return of an insurer but represents the insurer's cost of issuing debt on the markets. As the cost of issuing debt increases, insurers must increase premiums to pay the higher interest rates demanded by the markets.
Interestingly, if the author does not control for the investment opportunities of insurers and past insurance market conditions, THREAT is no longer significant (result not shown). Thus, controlling for financial opportunities both in terms of the money accumulated through greater reserves (UNIT t -1 ) and future market conditions (TBILL, SNP500, CORPBOND, and CPI), insurers are inclined to listen to regulatory threats. The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Recall that the basic model stipulates that a firm's value is just equal to the average of its value under regulation and under no regulation. By controlling for investment opportunities, the value of the firm under no regulation is increased. If the firm has greater value without regulation, it may be more willing to ensure that it does not become regulated. A way to do this is to pay attention to what is transmitted in the news media about the possibility of regulating insurance.
The regression presented in Table 2 explains 50 percent of the variation in premium increases. Most of the variables are of the predicted sign and significant. The article uses this last model as its structural equation in the two-step procedure.
It is possible that the relation between THREAT and AUTOINC is not as specified in the preceding model. One possibility is that THREAT and AUTOINC are chosen simultaneously. Thus, by using an ordinary least square approach, the author may not be specifying the model properly. Moreover, in the model's equation 3, the term dq dp is observed. This term is not taken into account in the basic OLS regression. This point is addressed later in the article when a two-step estimator procedure is conducted. The author will show that if we control for the simultaneity between the two variables, the results not only hold, but that the effect of THREAT on AUTOINC is larger and more significant. But first the article presents the logistic regression used to explain the presence of a regulatory threat.
LOGIT Results
With other control variables, the testable logistic equation is THREAT Constant AUTOINC Other
In Table 4 , the result of the logistic regression is presented using THREAT as the dependent variable and AUTOINC as an explanatory variable. This shows that AUTOINC is not significant. The time period was divided in two to examine whether the passage of Proposition 103 influenced the presence of a regulatory threat. The author also deseasonalized the data and controlled for the redlining problems in 1993 as in Table 2 . It is hypothesized that both PROP103 and DUM93 should have a positive sign. PROP103 should be positive because consumer groups outside California may have wanted to jump on the bandwagon of Proposition 103 and request similar reforms in their own state. The author's hypothesis is supported since PROP103's coefficient is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. DUM93 should be positive because redlining problems in 1993 should induce consumers to request more regulation. The author's hypothesis does not seem to be supported though, as DUM93 is not significant. This may be explained by the fact that regulatory threats in 1993 were aimed at homeowners insurance rather than automobile insurance.
Two different trends appear to exist in the data. Before the passage of Proposition 103, the trend is positive and significant, whereas after Proposition 103 there is no significant trend, which is observable by adding the coefficients of TREND and TREND103. This indicates that there was a build-up in the presence of a regulatory threat leading to Proposition 103, and that the likelihood of a threat reached a plateau at that point. Only one of the quarter dummies (Q3) is significant. Its negative sign suggests that fewer threats existed in the summer. This is logical if we believe that people have better things to do during their vacation than complain about insurance premiums. Finally, the author added four other variables in the regression to explain THREAT: the average premium (PREMAVG), the average loss paid (LOSSPAID), an election dummy (ELECTION), and whether the insurance commissioner is elected (ELECTED). PREMAVG is included in the regression because the author posits that the greater the average premium, the more likely the threat of regulation. In other words, it is quite possible that what will influence THREAT is not only the premium increase, but also the absolute level of the premium. Conversely, the average paid loss is hy-pothesized to reduce the likelihood of a threat of regulation because more money goes back to policyholders. It is logical to expect that policyholders who see insurance companies working for them (in the sense that they are indemnified for a loss) would be less inclined to believe that insurers need to be more stringently regulated.
It can be seen that PREMAVG does indeed have a significant positive effect on THREAT, although it is significant at the 10 percent level only. This suggests that what induces the population to threaten the insurance industry is not the percentage increase in a given premium, as the AUTOINC variable is still insignificant, but the dollar value of the premium itself. LOSSPAID, however, has no significant effect on whether there is a threat of regulation, although it is of the predicted sign.
The author also controls for election periods through the ELECTION dummy variable and for whether the insurance commissioner is elected through the ELECTED dummy variable. These two variables plus LOSSPAID will be the instruments used for the two-step estimator procedure presented later in this article. The ELECTION variable equals one in the fourth quarter of an election year and zero otherwise. This variable is expected to have a positive effect on THREAT, since some politicians may use insurance rate regulation as a political platform. Finally, an elected insurance commissioner should be more willing to threaten to regulate the insurance industry as part of her mandate. On the other hand, an elected commissioner is more likely to need money to fund her reelection, which may make her more conciliatory toward the insurance industry and not encourage regulatory threats. Thus no a priori exists regarding the sign of ELECTED. Looking at the results, it can be seen that neither ELECTION nor ELECTED are significant.
The article shall use the regression presented in Table 4 as the structural equation for explaining the presence of a regulatory threat in the two-step estimator procedure.
TWO-STEP ESTIMATOR
Procedure
In the analysis presented in the section "OLS Results," it was assumed that the presence of a threat was exogenous to the model. It is possible, however, that this is not the case. Whether the news media transmit concerns regarding premium percentage increases may depend on factors that are endogenous to the model. For example, the threat of regulation can depend on premium increases; thus including THREAT as an explanatory variable of AUTOINC is a misspecification of the model. The author then has to extricate from the THREAT variable what can be explained by factors already included in the model. In other words, a two-step estimator needs to be used.
The problem encountered here is that one of the dependent variables (THREAT) is a qualitative variable. Following Maddala (1983, Chapter 8.8 ), the problem is specified as follows.
We have y 1 observed (AUTOINC) and y 2 dichotomous (THREAT),
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The structural equations are Maddala then says to first estimate equation (7) using OLS and equation (8) using a probit maximum likelihood function. By using the predicted value of equation (7) in (10) instead of y 1 , equation (10) can be estimated as a probit maximum likelihood function. Similarly, equation (9) can be estimated by using OLS and the predicted value of (8) instead of y 2 **. The important thing is to correctly specify the two structural equations. The structural equations are those shown in Tables 2 (AUTOINC) and 4 (THREAT).
Results
The results of the two-step procedure regression appear in Table 5 . The first two columns present the reduced-form equations, whereas the structural equations are shown in Columns 3 and 4. 25 Using the predicted value of the logistic (OLS) regression of Column 1 (Column 2) in the OLS (logistic) regression shown in Column 4 (Column 3) yields the final results.
The most interesting result of this procedure is given in Column 4. By controlling for the simultaneity between AUTOINC and THREAT, the size and significance of the THREAT coefficient in the regression are increased where AUTOINC is the dependent variable. It can be seen in Column 3, however, that AUTOINC is still not significant in determining the likelihood of THREAT. Using this two-step estimator, almost 52 percent of automobile liability insurance premium increases can be explained. 25 The structural equations in Columns 3 and 4 are those presented in Table 2 and in Table 4 . Value of the coefficient, standard error in parentheses ***, **, and * are significant at .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.
The author observes in the model that most of the exogenous variables are significant and are of the expected sign. For example, it is observed that premium increases in comprehensive automobile and in homeowners insurance positively affect premiums in automobile liability insurance. Moreover, as expected, the coefficient of COMPINC is greater than the coefficient of HOMEINC, which reflects the closer ties between liability and comprehensive insurance than between automobile liability and homeowners insurance. Another positive effect on current premium increases comes from last quarter's premium increase (AUTOINC t-1 ). This suggests that there is momentum in automobile liability premium increases. The author also observes that last period's unit price reduces premium increases. This reduction should be expected if UNIT t-1 instruments the accumulated reserves of insurers. The author's reasoning is that when reserves are greater, insurers do not need to increase premiums as much. The last operation-based explanatory variable is the average premium (PREMAVG). The results suggest that premium increases are greater when the premium is higher, as is expected in the model. This differs from the result in the basic OLS model (Table 2) , where premium increases were smaller when the premium itself was larger.
In the next group of explanatory variables, the negative sign of PROP103 is expected if the passage of Proposition 103 in California sends a credible message to the markets that more stringent price regulation is likely. The coefficient tells us that premium increases were on average 2.532 percentage points lower after the passage of Proposition 103 than before. Finally, three of the financial-market variables are of the expected sign (TBILL, SNP500 and CPI), but only one is significant (TBILL). This suggests that insurers set premium increases as a function of expected returns on investment. The positive sign on CORPBOND, which goes against the initial hypothesis, may be only that it does not instrument possible investment opportunities in corporate bonds, but rather that it represents the cost of borrowed funds for insurers. Moreover, the positive sign is not so problematic if one considers that long-term corporate bonds make up only 15 percent of total assets of P&C insurers (30 percent for life insurers).
To test the robustness of the results, the author ran a few other regressions. The first one uses all the information the author was able to gather on economic, demographic, and political state-specific conditions. The author reran the same analysis as in this section and in the Primary Results section. The robustness of the results was also tested, weighting the THREAT variable to take into account multiple mentions of possible regulation in a state in a quarter. None of the main conclusions changed: the presence of a regulatory threat reduces premium increases. Those tests are presented in the next section.
ROBUSTNESS
Full Model Table 6 presents the full regression model for explaining premium increases in automobile liability insurance. Using the base regression (Table 2) , other variables were added to control for geographic location and other demographic, political, and insurance market conditions. Five regional dummies (Northeast, Mideast, Southeast, Northwest, Southwest) were added first. The reason one would add regional dummies is that there may be differences across regions that are not picked up by any of the variables in the data set. This does not seem to be the case.
OLS
The author also added explanatory variables related to the insurance market. RE-SIDUAL represents the proportion of drivers insured through the residual market. This variable is expected to have a negative effect on premium increases. The reason is that prices in the residual market may act as an effective price ceiling for the voluntary market if consumers can opt for the residual market coverage. On the other hand, a positive sign would be obtained if the residual market runs a deficit that must be compensated by larger premiums on the voluntary market.
The HERFINDAHL variable is a measure of market concentration. The more concentrated a market, the more easily firms can collude, and the more likely a price increase by one insurer will be followed by price increases by other insurers. Another possibility is that concerted efforts to lower premiums among few big companies is easier. Thus no a priori exists concerning the relationship between HERFINDAHL and AUTOINC. Similarly, there are two possible effects for the number of companies (NUMCOS). First, the greater the number of companies, the greater the competition and the lower the price increases. Second, the greater the number of companies, the harder it is to concert efforts to lower premiums to avoid regulation and the greater the price increases. The reason both HERFINDAHL and NUMCOS are included is that the former is weighted in favor of large companies, whereas the latter is equally weighted. It is important to control for those two aspects of the supply of insurance given the size bias of the NAII Fast Track tapes. Also, given a Herfindahl measure, it is more difficult to influence price changes if there are more companies. Similarly, for a given number of companies, a greater Herfindahl measure means that collusion is easier.
It has been argued that direct writers have lower operating costs than independent agents (see Cummins and Vanderhei, 1979, and Barrese and Nelson, 1992) . This is often attributed to the greater fixed investment that a direct writer makes in establishing an office in a given state. Since direct writers have a greater proportion of their assets invested in fixed assets, it is expected that they will have greater exposure to regulation risk since it is relatively more costly for them to exit a market than it is for independent agents. Therefore, direct writers should be more willing to appease the population and regulators. Thus the greater DWSHARE, the lower price increases should be. Finally, the author does not a priori have any hypothesis as to the effect of the number of agents (AGENTS) in a state.
The results seem to indicate that the hypotheses concerning the effect of RESIDUAL and NUMCOS are correct. The greater the proportion of drivers insured through the residual market, the smaller the price increases, and the greater the number of companies, the smaller the increases. HERFINDAHL and DWSHARE are not significant, however.
Political variables are also included to represent the state's regulatory environment. The dummy variables included are whether automobile insurance is a regulated line (REGULATION), whether the state has a no-fault law (NOFAULT), and whether the governor is a Democrat (GOVDEM). Other regulatory environment variables included are the Democrats' proportion of seats in the state's lower house (HOUSEDEM) and the state's per capita budget (BUDPOP). We expect all these variables to have a negative effect on increases in the price of automobile liability insurance.
Price increases should be smaller in a state that regulates its automobile insurance sector if regulation acts as a price ceiling, which seems to be the case for the time frame studied here (see Harrington, 1992, and Suponcic and Tennyson, 1995) . In a no-fault state, the premium increase should also be smaller because the need for liability insurance is reduced. Also, states that have a large no-fault threshold should be less prone to large liability insurance cost and premium increases. The next three variables represent the political willingness to regulate automobile insurance. It has been argued that Democrats are more willing to regulate insurance markets than Republicans. Hence the author controls for whether the governor's mansion (GOVDEM) and/or the state's lower house (HOUSEDEM) is held by Democrats. The state's per capita budget may help determine whether insurers can charge the premium they desire. The greater the state legislature's per capita budget, the more likely it is that the insurance commissioner's office will be staffed with employees who monitor insurance companies closely. Thus the greater the state's per capita budget, the greater the pressure to keep insurance premiums constant. Finally, it is expected that insurers will reduce their price increases during election season to reduce the probability that a candidate may use insurance regulation as an election platform, or that insurance regulation will become an issue during the election. It can be seen that none of these five variables is significant.
The last kind of variable included in the regression is state demographic variables (income, urbanization, college education, general education, age, etc.). 26 None of these is significant. This would suggest that the demographic composition of a state has no effect on automobile liability premium increases. A possible conclusion could be that automobile liability premium variations are purely because of supply shocks rather than demand shocks. This would make sense if one believes that automobile insurance is an inelastic good.
LOGIT
Presented now are the results from the logit analysis controlling for state-specific demographic, economic, and political situations. Using our base logit model (Table 4) , the results are shown in Table 7 .
First, it is interesting to observe that AUTOINC is not significant, while PREMAVG is significant at the 10 percent level. In this full logit model, the author controlled for geographic differences in the United States. The interesting location is the Southwest, which includes all states neighboring California, except Oregon. It can be seen that a threat of regulation is no more likely in these states than in any other, at least not significantly. This result contradicts the Fields et al. (1990) bellwether hypothesis. Fields et al. hold that the effect of the threat of regulation should be greater in states neighboring California. No evidence of that was found when controlling for everything else. Value of the coefficient, standard error in parentheses ***, **, and * are significant at .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.
Of all the explanatory variables related to the insurance market, only the proportion of drivers insured through the residual market and the number of insurance companies in a state are significant. Both RESIDUAL and NUMCOS are positive, which suggests that the greater the proportion of residual market drivers in a state, the more likely the threat of regulation, and the same holds for the number of companies. It makes sense that insurers in states with larger residual markets are more ('000,000) likely to be threatened with regulation. A large residual market means that high-risk drivers cannot find insurance, which means that they may be more likely to fight premium increases, and thus more likely to be in favor of regulation.
As for the number of companies affecting regulatory threat positively, the author is at a loss to explain this result. A possible explanation is that tacit collusion between insurance companies to preempt regulation is less feasible as the number of insurers increases. Another explanation is that smaller insurers, which make up most of the difference in the number of companies from one state to the next, had the most troubles during the liability crisis because of their lack of capital. They were thus less able to voluntarily suppress rates in the presence of a regulatory threat.
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Of all the regulatory environment variables, only REGULATION and NOFAULT are significant at the 5 percent level. A priori, it was expected that REGULATION and NOFAULT would have a negative effect on THREAT, since drivers are supposedly not as concerned with liability insurance in no-fault states as in liability states, and, in states that are already regulated, the threat of regulation is moot. The hypotheses regarding REGULATION and NOFAULT seem to be supported.
On the other hand, it was expected that HOUSEDEM, GOVDEM, BUDPOP, ELECTED, and ELECTION would have a positive effect on THREAT. Democrats are arguably more willing to regulate the insurance industry. Therefore a Democratic majority in the state's lower house and/or a Democratic governor should encourage threats of regulating the automobile liability insurance industry or even make the threats themselves. Similarly, an insurance commissioner's office that has more money (because the state's per capita budget is greater) may be more willing to regulate automobile liability insurance. An elected insurance commissioner should be more willing to threaten to regulate the insurance industry as part of her mandate. Finally, it seemed logical that around election time some candidate would use insurance regulation as an election platform, increasing the likelihood of a threat of regulation. Of these five variables, only HOUSEDEM is of the expected sign. It is also significant at the 10 percent level. All other variables are not significant.
The last group of variables consists of the state's demographics. From the data, it seems that the proportion of the population with a college degree (COLLEGE), the proportion of new migrants in a state (MIGRANTS), and the size of the state's insurance market as a proportion of the country's (RAUTODPW) all have a significant and positive effect on the likelihood that a threat will be observed. Conversely, the average years of education in a state (EDUCATION) and the total miles driven in the state (TOTMILES) reduce the likelihood of a regulatory threat.
The results presented in this section suggest that automobile liability premium increases do not seem to have any effect on the presence of a regulatory threat. The absolute premium, however, seems to have a positive effect on the presence of a regulatory threat.
Similarly to using the base model, the author used a two-step estimator to control for the endogeneity between THREAT and AUTOINC. The results of this two-step procedure are presented in tables 8A through 8D. The reduced-form equations are in tables 8A and 8B, and the structural equations in tables 8C and 8D. The author used the predicted value of the logistic (OLS) regression of Table 8A (8B) in the OLS (logistic) regression displayed in Table 8D (8C) to obtain the final results. The most interesting result of this procedure is shown in Table 8D . It can be seen by using all available information that the goodness of fit of the second-step regression (as measured by the R 2 ) is reduced. This suggests that we may be over-specifying the problem by using the so-called full model. The effect of THREAT remains significant at the 1 percent level, although its size on premium increases is reduced from -9.576 to -2.881. Another interesting point to make concerning the results in Table 8D is that PREMAVG is no longer significant. This means that most of the significance of PREMAVG in Table 6 is picked up by the second stage procedure used in Table 8D . In other words, the average premium is no longer a factor in determining the average premium increase once the author controlled for factors affecting the THREAT variable.
An interesting aspect of the results presented in Table 8D is that some variables (REGU-LATION, GOVDEM, and RAUTODPW) that were not significant in Table 6 are now significant. These new results suggest that premium increases are smaller when automobile liability insurance is regulated, which was expected. They also suggest that the presence of a Democratic governor in the state capital induced smaller premium increases, which was also expected.
Other Tests
The second test was done by modifying the THREAT variable to take into account multiple hits. This was done as a measure of the importance of the regulatory threat in a state in a quarter. Thus far, the THREAT variable could take only the values 0 and 1. This variable was modified by letting the number of hits determine THREAT. The hypothesis is that the more references to regulatory threat, the smaller price increases should be. These results are presented in Table 9 . Only base model regressions are presented. The full model regressions yield similar results.
28 It can be seen that taking into account multiple hits does not change the main result; THREAT remains significant at the 1 percent level, although the size of the coefficient is reduced from -9.578 to -3.188. The other differences come from TREND103, which becomes significant at the 1 percent level, CPI, at the 5 percent level, and SNP500, at the 10 percent level. These three coefficients are of the expected sign.
A third test was run and concerned the use of COMPINC and HOMEINC as explanatory variables of AUTOINC. Since comprehensive, homeowners, and liability insurance may be sold in a bundle to insureds, a methodological problem might exist in using premium increases in comprehensive automobile insurance and homeowners insurance to determine premium increases in automobile liability insurance. A way to bypass this problem is to use the underlying cost factors that determine liability insurance premiums. Using factors such as the CPI increase 29 in the cost of energy, used vehicles, new vehicles, public transportation, private transportation, healthcare services, and premium gasoline, does not change the results significantly. In fact, THREAT remains significant at the 1 percent level, although the size of the coefficient is reduced from -9.578 to -7.007. Furthermore, the R 2 of the regression falls from R 2 = 0.519 to R 2 = 0.317. These results are available from the author on request.
A final robustness test was run by modifying the regulation variables to take into account a broader spectrum of regulatory stringency. Dummy variables were con- 28 The author ran all the regressions using this weighted measure of threat. None of the results was significantly different from the one presented using a dichotomous threat variable. 29 The consumer price indices were obtained on the Web site of the United States Department of Commerce (www.doc.gov). 
CONCLUSION
The Regulatory Threat Hypothesis was tested using state quarterly data from 1984 to 1993 provided by the National Association of Independent Insurers. The dependent variable was constructed as the percentage price increase in automobile liability insurance from one quarter to the next. Multiple regressions were run using a measure of the threat of regulation as the most interesting explanatory variable. The author also controlled for many other economic and demographic factors that might explain premium increases. It is believed that the results show strong evidence that in the presence of a credible threat of regulation, insurance companies reduced their automobile liability insurance premiums (or at least reduced the increase in their premiums) during the liability crisis of the late 1980s. This is in accordance with the regulatory threat hypothesis.
According to the results presented in Table 5 , the presence of a regulatory threat reduced premium increases on average by 9.6 percentage points (or 2.9 percentage points according to the results of Table 8D ). Given that the average premium increase was 1.68 percent, it follows that when a threat of regulating automobile liability insurance occurred, premiums declined by 7.9 percentage points. This premium reduction was even more important after the adoption by referendum in California of Proposition 103. It appears that Proposition 103 sent a credible signal to the markets that the automobile insurance industry needed to take regulatory threat seriously. The mere adoption of this proposition reduced premium increases by more than 2.5 percentage points.
Many different models were presented, including one in which the dependent variable was changed from the average percentage premium increase to the average absolute premium. The author found that in the presence of a regulatory threat, the absolute premium was smaller. The results are robust enough to conclude that the threat of regulation had a significant effect on the way insurers priced automobile liability insurance during the liability crisis of the late 1980s.
One final notable aspect regarding the significance of the regression is that it is not because of a specific model specification. The robustness of the results was tested in two important ways. First, the author tested for specification errors by adding statespecific demographic, economic, and political variables. The main results were not affected. Second, the THREAT variable was modified to take into account multiple hits. Again, the qualitative results were not affected. The author can therefore state that the results are robust to model specifications.
The last type of instrument is time. PROP103 is the dummy variable whose value is one after the passage of Proposition 103 in California and zero before (for every quarter after 88:4 PROP103 equals 1). ELECTION equals one in the last quarter of every even year, which corresponds to the election quarter. DUM93 is a dummy variable to take into account all redlining problems encountered in homeowners insurance in 1993. DUM93 is equal to 1 for the year 1993. TREND is a time trend whose value increases by one at every quarter. Finally, Q1, Q2, and Q3 are seasonal dummies.
DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC
The demographic data were loaned to the author by Sharon Tennyson, 32 whereas the economic variables were found in the Citibase data tapes. RESIDUAL is the percentage of automobile drivers insured through the residual market in a state. HERFINDAHL is the Herfindahl index of market concentration in automobile liability insurance. INCOME is the average per capita income of a state. URBAN is the percentage of counties considered urban in the United States census. TOTMILES is the total miles driven in a state. DWSHARE is the market share of direct writers in automobile liability. RAUTODPW is equal to the ratio of the state's automobile liability direct premiums written to the country's as a whole. YOUNG is the percentage of the population between the ages of 18 and 24. FATALITIES represents the fatalities in car accidents. HOSPDAY is the average cost of one day of hospital stay. BUDPOP is equal to the total state budget divided by the state's population. AGENTS is the number of insurance agents in the state. 33 Finally, NUMCOS is the number of insurance companies that sell automobile liability in the state. All these variables are not available by quarter. Still, that is not considered important, since they should not vary much within a year (especially not the URBAN variable).
COLLEGE is the percentage of the population with a college degree in 1990. MI-GRANTS is the percentage of the population new to the state in 1990 compared with 1980. EDUCATION is the average number of years of education of the population in 1990. These variables are not available by year.
Finally, United States economic data are used to consider the investment opportunities of insurance companies (or their cost of capital). TBILL is the return on United States Treasury bills, CORPBOND is the return on long-term corporate bonds, SNP500 is the return on the Standard and Poor's 500, and CPI is the consumer price index increase.
